Developing the “Good Citizen”: Digital Artifacts, Peer Networks, and Formal Organization During the 2003-2004 Howard Dean Campaign

Daniel Kreiss *

* Department of Communication, Stanford University,

Online Publication Date: 01 July 2009
Developing the “Good Citizen”: Digital Artifacts, Peer Networks, and Formal Organization During the 2003–2004 Howard Dean Campaign

Daniel Kreiss

ABSTRACT. The 2003-2004 Howard Dean campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination is often heralded as the prototypical example of peer-driven politics. Building from an emerging body of literature on the Dean campaign, through interviews with key staffers and a survey of public documents I complicate this view by analyzing the interplay between the formal campaign organization, digital artifacts, and citizen networks. I demonstrate that from the earliest days of the primary the campaign developed strategies and innovative organizational practices for convening and harnessing citizen networks. Drawing on analytical perspectives that combine Foucauldian “governmentality” and actor-network theory, I argue that this was facilitated through the deployment of a set of artifacts that realized and leveraged “networked sociality.” Finally, I argue that while the Internet Division of the campaign adopted many “postbureaucratic” practices, it was embedded in a formal organizational hierarchy that shaped its technical work.

KEYWORDS. Actor-network theory, campaigns, democracy, Internet, open source politics, organizations, peer production

On a warm August night in 2003, Governor Howard Dean, frontrunner for the Democratic presidential nomination, bounded up on stage in New York City’s Bryant Park carrying a red inflatable baseball bat. In the midst of a drive to raise $1 million before the governor’s appearance, a comment on Blog For America suggested that, in recognition of their achievement, Dean carry the bat as a reference to the online graphic that showed donors their progress towards the goal. For Dean’s Campaign Manager Joe Trippi (2005, p. 8) this was a canonical moment, symbolic of the fact that volunteers and small donors had ownership over the campaign through the use of new online networked communications tools. Many academic accounts echo Trippi in emphasizing the peer-to-peer processes that appeared to be driving the Dean campaign. For example, Henry Jenkins (2006, p. 208) argues that “peer-to-peer rather than one-to-many communication” characterized the campaign. Lawrence Lessig (2003) argues that the Dean effort demonstrated “yet another context into which open source ideals can usefully migrate,” while Manuel Castells (2007, p. 251) describes the campaign as an example of “autonomous forms of political organizing.”

Daniel Kreiss is a Ph.D. candidate in Stanford University’s Department of Communication. The author thanks the anonymous readers of the Journal of Information Technology & Politics; Fred Turner, Nicholas Anstead, and David Karpf for detailed readings of earlier drafts of this article; and is indebted to the insightful comments of the audience at the Politics: Web 2.0 conference hosted at University of London, Royal Holloway, April 17–18, 2008.

Address correspondence to: Daniel Kreiss, Department of Communication, Building 120, 450 Serra Mall, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-2050 (E-mail: dkreiss@stanford.edu).
These characterizations in turn reflect paradigmatic theoretical perspectives that proceed from and rework well-established theories of collective action (Olson, 1965; Tarrow, 1998) in positing how new communications technologies are fundamentally reshaping the problem of “free riding” and the necessity of formal, hierarchical organizations. Bimber, Flanigin, and Stohl (2005, p. 381) argue that “self-organizing” increasingly characterizes collective action in a world with dramatically falling information costs and routine “private-to-public boundary spanning.” Meanwhile, similar to other formulations of networks as a distinct organizational form (Podolny & Page, 1998; Powell, 1990), Benkler’s (2002, 2006) influential theory of “commons-based peer production” describes voluntary, leveled, and communicatively reciprocal networked collaboration that is distinct from both the firm (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975) and the market. This new form of large-scale collective action is posited to have great import for political practice, especially with regard to the public sphere, and is made possible by “decentralized information gathering and exchange” (Benkler, 2002, p. 375).

While these analytical approaches do not entirely overlook the existence and persistence of formal, hierarchical organizations in a world suffused by networks, these structures are generally understudied or assumed to be taking on features of networks, given shifts in the information environment. For example, Benkler (2002, p. 391) acknowledges the role of formal organizations in convening and “harnessing” peer production, but there is a general lack of attention to the ways this occurs and the interactions between organizational forms. Indeed, much work on commons-based peer production proceeds as if networks are autonomous organizational entities. Meanwhile, a body of work on “postbureaucratic organizations” (Hecksher & Donnellon, 1994) posits that some formal organizations increasingly resemble networks. In the political domain, Bimber (2003) argues that postbureaucracy is characterized by a flexible structure, an acute orientation to changes in the external environment, and a decline in formal roles as contracts between individuals, collaborations, and partnerships take place outside of the formal organization.

This study turns to the Howard Dean campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination to explore the relationship between digital artifacts, formal campaign organizations, and peer networks. Despite a rich body of theory on collective action, empirical research on the organizational structures and technical practices of electoral campaigns is surprisingly limited. Students of politics generally have little purchase on the processes by which artifacts are adopted by campaign organizations, and many studies detailing how candidates use new media (Bimber & Davis, 2003; Howard, 2006) were conducted prior to the emergence of the social-technical practices that broadly characterize “Web 2.0 environments” (Chadwick, 2009, p. 34). Meanwhile, an emerging body of work finds the Dean effort to be a rich research site, given the campaign’s unprecedented adoption of network theory and Internet applications (Foot & Schneider, 2006; Wiese & Gronbeck, 2005). These studies undermine many accounts of the campaign as a uniquely participatory, emergent, and decentralized phenomenon. For example, Hindman (2005, 2008) demonstrates how the campaign used the Internet to revolutionize the “backend” of institutionalized political practice: fundraising, volunteer recruitment, and voter mobilization. In addition, a body of work documents the limits of interactivity, lack of substantive forms of citizen participation on the campaign (Haas, 2006; Stromer-Galley & Baker, 2006), and ongoing importance of formal organizations and elite professionals in collaborative, participatory campaign practices (Hindman, 2007, p. 195).

In turn, a number of scholars have pointed to the organizational complexity of the campaign. Jett and Välikangas (2004, p. 3) characterize the campaign as a form of “open source organizing” that is “a network in many respects, but it also exhibits the fluidity of a market and the goal-oriented discipline of a formal organization.” Taking a more meso-level view, in an analysis that includes the Dean campaign, Chadwick (2007, p. 14) draws from social movement theory to argue that “digital network repertoires” facilitate the creation of “hybrid”
organizational forms that use “mobilization strategies typically associated with parties, interest groups, and new social movements.” Each of these perspectives makes a valuable contribution in providing an analytical framework for thinking about networked collective action in a way that avoids overemphasizing peer-to-peer processes while paying close attention to the complexities of organizational forms and practices.

This article extends this empirical work on the Dean campaign and contributes to theoretical perspectives on networked politics by closely detailing the campaign’s organizational and technical practices. Through open-ended interviews with key staffers and a survey of public documents, including archived Web pages, professional press articles, blog posts, and first-hand accounts, especially Trippi’s (2004) autobiographical The Revolution Will Not Be Televised and Streeter and Teachout’s (2007) edited collection Mousepads, Shoe Leather, and Hope, this article proceeds in three parts. I begin by discussing the strategy behind the campaign’s uptake of networked communications tools and argue that staffers and consultants developed a novel set of practices that centered and thus leveraged the peer-to-peer networks that emerged independently of the campaign early in the primaries. Drawing from analytical perspectives that couple Foucauldian governmentality and actor-network theory, I next turn to analysis of the innovative networked artifacts that realized and structured digitally “networked sociality” (Wittel, 2001) to further backend campaign practices, detailing how campaign staffers’ version of the “good citizen” (Schudson, 1998) was technically and discursively produced. I then show how these practices were shaped by, and in turn influenced, formal organizational processes, especially as peer networks served as resources for staffers and advisors in internal organizational conflicts. In the process I argue that the case of the Dean campaign suggests that collaborative peer networks are structured by the demands of an inter-organizational environment, political institutions, and intra-organizational processes.

CENTERING THE DEAN CAMPAIGN

By the late summer of 2003, Howard Dean, former governor of Vermont, was at the top of the polls for the Democratic presidential nomination despite entering the race as an outsider candidate. To many close observers of politics, Dean’s meteoric rise was fueled by new Internet applications including blogs and Meetup—a Web site that facilitates offline gatherings—that enabled citizens to self-organize. Trippi (2003) even argued that the role of the formal campaign organization was simply to “provide the tools and some of the direction . . . and get the hell out of the way when a big wave is building on its own.” While this is a romantically democratic account, in reality these citizen networks were convened and harnessed for backend labor through an innovative set of organizational and technical practices honed by the formal campaign organization. As Jerome Armstrong (2006), an influential progressive blogger who served as an advisor and consultant for the campaign, described their strategy:

Much has been said about the decentralized and emergent quality of the Howard Dean campaign, and many people, actions, and efforts did emerge with the volition to join in word and deed; but from the very beginning, from May and June of 2002, there was tacit encouragement of the decentralized campaign, from the very center.

Understanding how this strategy developed is contingent upon the detailed consideration of the socio-technical context within which the 2003–2004 primaries occurred. Political blogs, while not new, had growing user-bases and visibility by 2002, the time when potential candidates were making initial hires to staff their nascent campaign organizations. Blogs served as sites for Democratic Party activists to discuss politics and candidates independently of the formal campaigns, many of which lacked dedicated Web sites for presidential runs until the fall and winter of 2002, and even then were technically unsophisticated. The majority of these online progressive party activists and
bloggers were interested in and active promoters of Dean’s candidacy, becoming engaged well before he formally announced his intention to run for the nomination. This was, in part, a result of Dean’s antiwar stance, which appealed to the base of the party.

Not only did Dean’s independent online support outstrip that of the other candidates early in the primary cycle, it also proved highly consequential with respect to identifying and taking advantage of opportunities that were later leveraged by the campaign. During the summer of 2002, a network of blogs including MyDD, run by Jerome Armstrong, and the volunteer-created and administered Howard Dean 2004 (later called Dean Nation) not only provided activists with outlets to become engaged in Dean’s candidacy in the absence of a fully functional formal campaign organization, these efforts also served as Dean’s de facto Internet presence. For example, when William Finkel of Meetup was contacting all the Democratic primary candidates in early 2003 to offer them formalized use of the online application, he wrote to the volunteer administrator of Howard Dean 2004, Aziz Poonawalla. After featuring a link on the site, Howard Dean 2004 drove the initial use and growth of Meetup among the campaign’s supporters. Armstrong (2007, pg. 47) eventually put Finkel in touch with Trippi and convinced the campaign to adopt it as an organizing tool, making Dean the only candidate that responded to the firm’s initial inquiry. Meetup went on to become the organizational core of Dean’s online effort and a significant fundraising vehicle. Just as importantly, it was a symbol of the campaign’s technological proficiency for the political press. By the summer of 2003, Meetup supporters even served as a transparent and verifiable metric for political journalists to judge the strength of primary campaigns.

These blogs were also hubs of online activity that the campaign strove to incorporate to garner financial and human resources. After Trippi formally joined the candidate as Campaign Manager in January 2003, he sought to provide coordinated, routine direction to these volunteer efforts by convening them through the networked technologies of the formal campaign organization. Armstrong recalls a meeting in early 2003 with his consulting partner Markos Moulitsas Zúnigu, founder of the blog Daily Kos, and Trippi, during which they crafted the broad contours of the campaign’s Internet strategy:

The three of us discussed what we believed could be brought inside the campaign from the ongoing decentralized effort—the gist of “the revolution” being to launch an official national campaign blog, where the online community, fundraising, and organizing efforts could be centralized. . . . (Armstrong, 2007, p. 45)

This strategy was implemented through the campaign’s Internet Division, which crafted novel organizational practices and deployed networked artifacts including blogs and Meetup to bring extant and new networks inside its sphere of operations and thus provide them with direction. As such, the campaign worked toward creating and fostering a geographically distributed community of bloggers, supporters, volunteers, and funders that congregated at the Web site and blog and monitored the activities there. The aim was to ensure that supporters could be routinely and quickly mobilized to perform the fundraising and organizing tasks that needed to be accomplished, often to attract press coverage.

To implement this strategy, the campaign recruited and hired a number of staffers for the Internet Division who had technical expertise from outside the political field and often in commercial settings. Trippi (2004, p. 54) himself exemplified the way some of these staffers bridged professional fields: he possessed nearly three decades of experience running political campaigns, in addition to having worked for a number of Internet startups during the late 1990s that he referred to as “a few brash young companies,” including Wave Systems, Smart Paper Networks, and Progeny Linux Systems. Trippi argued that this work shaped his understanding of how technology could be used in electoral politics. He was joined on the campaign by a number of individuals who possessed less extensive political experience, but who shared knowledge and skills relating to the
Internet that were then applied to a political campaign. These resources were essentially carried across contexts, a phenomenon that a number of scholars have noted with respect to social movement organizations (Gusfield, 1981; Staggenborg, 1988; Taylor, 1989).

On the one hand, this was reflected organizationally. For example, Bobby Clark (2007, p. 77), an entrepreneur who worked on technology startups in Colorado and California, was the first Web strategist for the campaign and recruited his former colleague, Dave Kochbeck, to serve as the campaign’s first information technology (IT) director. Clark describes how Kochbeck’s commercial technology experience helped him understand the challenges of a campaign, as he “served as our campaign’s chief technology officer (CTO), as he had for our San Francisco startup. . . .” (Clark, 2007, p. 77). On the other, these professional and technical skills helped shape the practices of the campaign. Clay Johnson, a freelance technology consultant and lead programmer for Dean, and Nicco Mele, the Webmaster for the campaign who had extensive experience in similar positions with various progressive organizations, were both central figures who created the campaign’s technical infrastructure. Staffers within the Internet Division also included Matthew Gross and Joe Rospars, both of whom were bloggers prior to joining the campaign and were instrumental in the launch and development of Blog for America, the first blog hosted by a presidential campaign. In characterizing their approach to using the Internet in electoral politics, Zack Rosen (personal communication, April 7, 2008), a volunteer developer with Hack4Dean who was hired as a staff member in late fall 2003, described the Internet Division in new economy terms as “feeling like a creative, creative project rather than a managed organization.”

Professional backgrounds alone do not explain the organizational and technical innovations of the Dean campaign, because a number of candidates had Internet staff members that similarly bridged fields. Many staffers also attribute these innovations to a willingness to experiment born of the widespread acknowledgment during the early stages of the primaries that a fresh approach was necessary to be competitive. This was all the more important given the candidate’s limited resources and name recognition, his estrangement from the Democratic Party’s establishment, and the press’s relative dismissal of the candidacy. This helped foster what Zephyr Teachout (personal communication, July 10, 2008), Dean’s Director of Online Organizing, characterizes as innovation born of necessity, and this was supported by Trippi’s considerable resources as Campaign Manager. For staffers within the Internet Division, Web-based tools including blogs and Meetup maximized the resources of the campaign by leveraging the work of thousands of supporters and volunteers. A conversation in early 2003 between Armstrong (2006) and Trippi makes this clear: “You don’t understand,” said Joe. “This campaign has no money. Look, John Kerry has a list of 20,000 hardcore supporters, nationwide, OK. . . . How are you guys going to get Howard Dean enough people to go head to head with John Kerry? Can the Net do this?”

As such, these concerns drove much of the campaign’s uptake of networked tools. The Internet not only provided resources, but was also the basis for staged, high-profile events that attracted press coverage, as journalists marveled at Dean’s success in raising money in small online increments, part of the campaign’s communications strategy detailed below (see Armstrong, 2007, p. 50). Through online fundraising and Meetup, Dean was not only able to keep pace with Kerry’s fundraising and volunteer operation, but by summer of 2003 actually exceeded him. At the same time, online fundraising, combined with the continued growth of Dean Meetups, served to legitimate the campaign for other actors in the field, especially journalists, but by extension elected officials and the public; this was reflected in Dean’s high-profile endorsements and rise in the polls throughout 2003.

All of this was premised on the development and deployment of networked artifacts that were themselves the result of novel organizational practices. Similar to the commercial firms that Neff and Stark (2003) describe as “permanently beta” with their flexible organizational structures and continuously developed
and in-process products, the campaign’s Internet Division turned to the Web to recruit the volunteers and consultants who helped develop many of the networked artifacts that the campaign ultimately deployed. As Teachout (2007, p. 68) describes, when the Internet Division needed a new organizing tool they would often “put up a request for help on the blog.” At other times technical projects that originated in the supporter community were incorporated into the campaign. For example, the volunteer group Hack4Dean, a distributed network of over 100 programmers, developed the Web application DeanSpace, a toolkit built on the open source platform Drupal that enabled supporters to set up their own Web sites and plan events for Dean. Mele (personal communication, July 29, 2008), Dean’s Webmaster, argues that these practices of utilizing a volunteer base tied together the political culture of the grassroots and “the open source, collaborative world.” That said, they were also compelled by the limited resources of the campaign. Given a lack of programmers, staffers were used to going online and “asking for help when we needed it” (Teachout, 2007, p. 68). There was also the expediency in some cases of reaching beyond the formal boundaries of the organization given the “political maneuvering” necessary to have technical needs addressed in an environment with limited resources and competing staff priorities (Nuxoll, 2007, p. 197; Teachout, 2007, p. 66).

As is clear, many of the organizational practices of the Internet Division resemble the features of postbureaucratic organizations detailed by Bimber (2003). Indeed, the postbureaucratic work style of the Internet staffers is what enabled the campaign to center the labor of peer networks. Staffers responsible for Internet fundraising and Meetup were constantly capturing and monitoring fundraising data and volunteer numbers, tailoring their work to respond to the labor of peer networks and changes in the campaign environment. Staffers were also, at times, attentive to comments on Blog for America and used their own posts to rebut charges from rivals, respond to professional press articles, disseminate the campaign’s messages, and issue calls to action. In essence, they convened their own 24-hour alternative messaging service that was highly responsive to the campaign environment. In turn, many staffers cited how their positions on the Internet team were more fluid than those of other divisions, as they grappled with shared technical challenges, worked on collaborative projects, and interacted with the peer networks around the formal organization.

This does not mean that there was no specialization or formal processes within the Internet Division. Mele (personal communication, July 29, 2008) had deep knowledge of the Internet’s use in political and advocacy campaigns and describes a sentiment echoed by many other staffers: “In the beginning we were very reactive, we were trying to figure this out on the fly.” Over time, he argues, the campaign developed more stable goals and routines relating to e-mail list growth and organizing, while staffers increasingly took on more defined tasks. Zack Rosen (personal communication, April 7, 2008) describes how routines coexisted with the demands of networks:

There definitely was some formal management and formal work processes that had to be done to run a national organization. The Web site needs to be updated, you’d be writing, blogging, there’s newsletters and fundraising. All the necessities of a national campaign organization had to be filled. But in addition to that was a bunch of work that had to do with directly leveraging the work that was done outside of the national campaign organization by the volunteers independently.

These tasks were continually negotiated in practice, and through interactions with the other divisions of the campaign.

The practices of the Internet Division resulted in an extraordinary array of Web-based tools that were not only innovations in the political field, but also stood alongside some of the earliest prototypes of what we now refer to as “social networking” sites. To analyze these shifts in political practice, I draw from theorists that couple Foucauldian “governmentality” and actor-network theory. I argue that these artifacts realized certain citizenship practices
while harnessing the work of peer networks towards the campaign’s strategic ends.

**NETWORKED ARTIFACTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CITIZENSHIP**

The Dean campaign was the first electoral effort to widely deploy new media platforms to realize, convene, and make visible social networks in order to channel their collaborative labor toward organizational goals. As such, digital artifacts were innovative means of connecting citizens to political institutions and structuring their practices. This occurred through the leveraging of digitally “networked sociality,” which Wittel (2001, p. 51) describes as consisting of “fleeting and transient, yet iterative social relations; of ephemeral but intense encounters. . . .” In network sociality the social bond at work is not bureaucratic but informational; it is created on a project-by-project basis, by the movement of ideas. . . .” While Wittel is concerned more broadly with the social practice of network-making, for the purposes here I refer only to the collaborative social mode that characterized the digital peer networks clustered around and convened by the Dean campaign. In predating both the coining of the phrase Web 2.0 (Scholz, 2008) and the commercial applications including Facebook and YouTube that are now synonymous with social networking, the campaign was a prototype for the socio-technical practices that, as Chadwick (2009, p. 16) argues, constitute a turn from the “deliberative assumption.”

While the literature on peer production and new forms of online collective action generally lacks a theoretical account of the relationship between formal organizations, peer networks, and mediating artifacts, science and technology studies offers a series of conceptual tools for analyzing the ways power is exercised through and structures networks. In recent years a number of scholars have productively combined actor-network theory with Foucauldian “governmentality” approaches to theorize relations of power in socio-technical practice. For Foucault, “governmentality,” or “the conduct of conduct,” “refers to all endeavors to shape, guide, and direct the conduct of others … and it also embraces the ways in which one might be urged and educated to bridle one’s passions, to control one’s instincts, to govern oneself” (Rose, 1999, p. 3). As such, governmentality does not explicitly relate to the state and extends beyond overtly controlling and constraining forms of domination, detailing the multiple ways power is productive of actions, guiding and shaping them from various sites (Burchell, 1996, p. 19). Extending Foucault, theorists have used actor-network theory (Callon, 1986; Latour, 2005; Latour & Weibel, 2005; Law & Hassard, 1999) to analyze the role of artifacts in structuring particular practices of citizenship. For example, Barry (2000, 2001) argues for research into the politics of interactivity, suggesting that through engagement with artifacts and technical regimes, we cede agency to tools that are productive of actions in structured ways (see also Andrejevic, 2004; Stromer-Galley, 2004). Of particular interest are the ways technical devices are embedded in assemblages that facilitate what Latour (1987) refers to as “action at a distance.” Barry, Osborne, and Rose (1996, p. 12) for instance describe how artifacts deployed at local sites help enroll citizens in networks that have state power as their effect.

The work of these theorists provides a lens for analyzing the artifacts that mediated between the Dean campaign and the peer networks that predated and were constituted by it. As noted above, the Internet Division of the campaign used technically skilled volunteer labor along with paid consultants to develop a host of applications for the campaign that were not only innovations in the political field but were both inspired by and stood alongside early commercial social networking Web sites. For example, DeanLink was a social networking Web site modeled after Friendster (Teachout, 2007, p. 69), and Generation Dean was a virtual community for young supporters (Michel, 2007, p. 155). GetLocal, developed with the help of Zach Exley, then the
Organizing Director of MoveOn.org, “allowed people to offer political events to those who wanted to attend, and turned the candidate Web site into a place where people could find each other. . . .” (Teachout, 2007, p. 65). This tool supplemented, but did not replace, Meetup, and provided greater functionality for supporters. Finally, TeamRaiser was a Web-based fundraising application developed for nonprofits by the firm Convio, which the campaign modified to enable volunteers to set fundraising goals on personalized Web pages (Larry Biddle, personal communication, October 20, 2008).

While these social networking technologies afforded supporters the opportunity to digitally gather around the campaign and form online, and even in-person, social relationships based on their political interests, identity, and geographic location, the successful channeling of this networked sociality towards the ends of the campaign entailed indirect forms of structuring citizen participation given that these peer networks were outside the boundaries of the formal organization. This involved technically producing certain types of citizenship practices along with legitimating select forms of participation through the hosting and design of these social spaces, messaging through e-mail and the blog, and, at times, direct staff contact. For example, much of the design and functionality of the Dean For America Web site reflected the campaign’s priorities by steering users towards contribution pages and offering interactivity only in select domains: users had numerous opportunities to make a donation to the campaign but could not contribute to a policy platform (Haas, 2006). Other applications were explicitly designed to leverage off- and online social relationships for the ends of the campaign. The TeamRaiser pages, which provided supporters with the opportunity to “create their own content on personal pages within the Web site—most often telling friends and family why they supported Howard Dean and asking them to do the same,” were directed towards fund-raising and were estimated to have helped raise “more than $1 million for the campaign” (Clark, 2007, p. 84). Meanwhile, DeanSpace enabled supporters to create their own affinity- and identity-based group blogs and forums for Dean, which were then networked through syndication technologies that allowed the sharing of content (Koenig, 2007, p. 207; Lebkowsky, 2005, p. 6), including that produced by the official organization.

Dean staffers within the formal organization in turn were acutely involved in the work of these networks. For example, there was a National Meetup Coordinator within the campaign’s field operations who was responsible for working with these groups. Michael Silberman (personal communication, July 28, 2008) describes some of the challenges he faced in this role, as volunteers . . . wanted to help elect Howard Dean president. Their goal was to do whatever we said was most useful. On the other hand, we had to be really careful of not being too much command and control because they were all volunteers, we didn’t know what worked in every community. . . . Even though a lot of the campaign was described as self-organized, people want to check in with the campaign and have a direct line to the campaign. . . .

This direct line consisted not only of best practices for the volunteers who were new to politics, but also detailed agendas for the volunteer hosts of Meetups that clearly conveyed the priorities of the campaign (Silberman, 2007, p. 114; see the Appendix). In many respects, the Meetup program resembled traditional field operations, but with a greater reliance on volunteer leaders to self-identify and play a staffers’ role in their own community, all of which was facilitated by an Internet application that enabled supporters to quickly and easily find their geographically proximate peers.

The socio-technical practices that leveraged networked sociality occurred in conjunction with the narrowcasting communication and data management practices that were institutionalized in the field and that Howard (2006) argues realizes forms of “managed citizenship.” This was clear in that while the campaign deployed many new social networking applications, e-mail remained the primary vehicle
through which the Field, Internet, and Finance divisions delivered messages to supporters. As Kelly Nuxoll (personal communication, November 19, 2008), the E-mail Director for the campaign, argues: “The campaign used e-mail as a broadcast mechanism rather than as a two-way mechanism” in urging citizens to attend fundraising and political events and donate money online. This strategy had its roots in the practices of MoveOn, which created the “industry standard” format of short text blocks with embedded links to donation or action pages (Biddle, 2007, p. 172). Indeed, Teachout (2007, p. 64) describes how the visit of Zack Exley and Eli Pariser of MoveOn to Dean headquarters in April 2003 revolutionized the work of the Internet Division: “That visit, more than any other single day, transformed the way we thought about much of the Internet campaign. In that day we moved from chaotic creativity to creativity driven by the need for e-mail list growth.” Coupled with the gathering of addresses and use of e-mail was the development of analytics that tracked not only the most successful appeals (so that messages could be tailored) but also supporter information across the range of Dean social networking applications. As Larry Biddle (personal communication, October 20, 2008), the Director for Direct Mail, Telemarketing in the Finance Division, described it, he worked to make sure that the campaign digitally captured what individuals were doing for Dean, including hosting parties and attending events, so the campaign could “get the most active people and have them telemarketed” to make a contribution.

As is clear, how these artifacts were deployed was a social decision and not a technical necessity. The tactics to “crowd- or open-source organizational processes” (Zack Rosen, personal communication, April 7, 2008) at the backend of operations came in lieu of more substantive involvement in the campaign, for example at the level of policy, strategy, or the allocation of resources. The policy platform of the candidate was the purview of the campaign’s formal advisors. Outside of an online vote that the campaign hosted about whether to participate in the public financing system, there are no other examples of the candidate reconsidering or taking a new public position on a matter of policy or strategy as a result of citizen input. In a largely complementary article in Wired, Gary Wolf (2004) noted this explicitly: “But since none of the grassroots groups are officially tied to the campaign, there is no guarantee of influence over policy. Dean is free to ignore the political wishes of any of these groups, and he often does.” Even the candidate’s Internet policy was closed to public debate, crafted in part by the campaign’s “Net Advisory Net,” a group of leading technologists and scholars that included Joichi Ito, David Weinberger, Howard Rheingold, and Lawrence Lessig. The limited nature of networked participation is also clear in the public criticism, aired after Dean’s losses in the early primaries, of the campaign’s decision to spend the bulk of its resources on television advertisements.4

In sum, networked artifacts were productive of certain types of citizenship practices, as they convened and leveraged networked sociability towards the strategic ends of the campaign. These organizational and technological innovations centered on the creation of a geographically dispersed and stable pool of supporters who could consistently be called upon to perform the fundraising and organizing needed by the campaign. As the social affordances of these artifacts implies, this stability was furthered by the range of emotional attachments and relationships that individuals developed through their engagement with each other and the campaign, not unlike Web 2.0 business models that commodify social labor (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005; Terranova, 2004), although with the shared political end of getting Dean elected. In this sense, while these supporters were outside of the formal organization’s boundaries, their work was structured through artifactual practices. At the same time, these artifacts extended the reach of citizens, offering them powerful new tools to organize their peers and support the candidate. While this addresses the relationship between the formal organization and peer networks, the next section details how these new media practices were shaped by internal organizational processes.
THE DEAN CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION

Given that the focus of attention among the press and scholars was on the Dean campaign’s online effort, many accounts have overlooked the ways in which the Internet Division of the campaign was embedded within a formal organization. This in turn has led to characterizations of the campaign that elide its formal structure, decision-making hierarchy, specialized divisions, and defined staff positions. In sum, in many respects it had an institutionalized organizational form that was broadly recognizable to professionals in the field. A detailed look at the structure of the campaign organization and its internal dynamics suggests that flexibility, a sensitivity to the external environment, and the decline of formal staff roles—typical postbureaucratic practices—were not uniformly the features of the Dean campaign organization, nor was it a radically decentralized and leveled form of political organization. Open-ended interviews with key staffers provide a richly detailed look at the Dean campaign organization and suggest how strategy and resource conflicts within its boundaries helped shape what peer networks were called upon to do, as much as the demands of a competitive electoral environment and the institutionalized practices of the political field.

While it was less publicly visible than the Internet Division (part of the campaign’s press strategy detailed below), the Dean campaign had a formal organizational structure that was responsible for its strategic planning and policy positions, as well as carrying out routine, day-to-day tasks, including coordinating field operations, managing communications, and performing the majority of its fundraising (see Figure 1). The individuals in these positions in turn generally had professional backgrounds that differed from the staffers of the Internet Division. Many of the Deputy Campaign Managers and Directors of the Field, Political, Finance, and Communications divisions were either long-time Dean aides or seasoned political staffers with extensive work experience in other campaigns, the Clinton administration, or party organizations. Meanwhile, the consulting firms hired by the campaign were well established in the political field. For example, Paul Maslin, Dean’s Pollster and Senior Advisor, is a partner in Fairbank, Maslin, Maulin & Associates, a highly regarded firm whose presidential clients included Gore, Dukakis, Hart, Mondale, and Carter.

These campaign divisions and specialized staff roles reflect the institutional context and organizational environment in which the campaign was embedded. Thus, it is only in light of an academic literature that emphasizes peer-driven political processes that scholars should be surprised by the formal Dean campaign organization. The Dean campaign had to become credible to other actors in the field, especially professional journalists and party leaders, by adopting a legitimate organizational form. At the same time the campaign needed to develop structures to accomplish routine tasks, including reporting to the Federal Election Commission, dealing with journalists looking for easily reachable and authoritative campaign spokespersons, coordinating volunteers and staffers in multiple states, meeting with influential citizen groups, and preparing the candidate’s schedule. In sum, while the formal organization leveraged collaborative labor for the backend tasks detailed above, there is little evidence that these peer networks could have commanded the resources necessary to deal with what required routine coordination.

In turn, staffers outside the Internet Division largely used new media in ways that “amplified” (Agre, 2002) the institutionalized practices of their respective domains. This was apparent in the Finance Division, which was the first to be staffers on the campaign and which grew to encompass over two dozen staffers under the direction of National Finance Director Stephanie Schriock, a veteran who joined Dean after a three-year stint at the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee. While it functioned outside of the public eye, by all accounts the fundraising efforts of the Finance Division were highly successful, especially given the underreported fact that offline surpassed online donations (Kelly Nuxoll, personal
FIGURE 1. Select snapshot of the Dean Campaign National Organization, December 2003. Organizational chart based on Federal Election Commission filings and adapted from the George Washington University campaign database, available online at: http://www.gwu.edu/~action/2004/dean/deanorg.html. For space and clarity, this leaves out the advisors and consultants who did not have defined roles in the campaign organization, in addition to many non-senior level positions (for example, the Finance Division had over two dozen staffers). As detailed in this article, it also does not reflect many of the actual working relationships of these staffers.

communication, November 19, 2008). And for the professionals working in finance, the Internet was seen as a tool that could extend established fundraising practices. For example, Biddle (personal communication, October 20, 2008) argues that he brought his experience as a nonprofit and political fundraising professional to bear on using the Internet to facilitate the events, telemarketing, and direct mail efforts of the campaign. Biddle urged potential donors to sign up for events online so that the campaign could better manage involvement. He incorporated proven text from solicitation letters into online asks, and he developed the analytics that enabled him to trace involvement and craft follow-up appeals.

The communications strategy of the campaign relied on a very old tactic: finding an effective news hook for journalists that would compel them to write about Dean. The Internet proved immensely useful in this regard, as Trippi, an established political professional for whom communications was a primary concern, deliberately staged high profile online fundraising actions to garner media coverage (Armstrong, 2007, p. 50). For example, in July 2003, the campaign posted a picture of the candidate eating a turkey sandwich on the Dean For America Web site to coincide with a $2,000-a-plate fundraiser hosted by Vice President Dick Cheney. Small donations poured in, and Dean out-raised Cheney by nearly $200,000. Meanwhile, this episode, and others
that were similarly designed to simultaneously raise money and receive press coverage, grabbed headlines heralding Dean’s online success, as journalists construed it as evidence for the radically innovative nature of the campaign and, by extension, the candidate.

At the same time there were numerous sites of internal conflict and organizational tension, as staffers argued over strategy, resources, the candidate’s ear, and Dean’s public image. Given that Trippi only hints at these conflicts in The Revolution Will Not Be Televised, they have received little attention in academic accounts of the campaign. While Trippi was Dean’s Campaign Manager, and was thus formally responsible for all of the campaign’s operations, advisors who had long relationships with the candidate from his time as governor and who held his trust made competing claims for organizational power. After the campaign’s losses in Iowa and New Hampshire, the professional press reported on these conflicts within the formal organization as keys to the spectacular collapse of a frontrunner. For example, writing in Salon, Benson (2004) echoes many participants in describing a campaign that was

... roughly divided into three groups of the governor’s top advisors from Vermont—Kate O’Connor and Bob Rogan in one camp, Trippi in another, and everyone else in a third. The result was that internal decision-making processes tended to be chaotic, with top supporters getting contradictory marching orders from Trippi and the Burlington staff in the same day.

However, the specific history of these conflicts is less important for the purposes of this article than how they were shaped by and consequential for the campaign’s internal organizational dynamics and what peer networks were called upon to do.

At the center of many of the dynamics of the campaign was the unique organizational position that the Internet Division occupied. As a number of staffers described, the Internet Division assumed tasks that spanned the domains of finance, communications, and field given that it was organized around a communications platform—one that was put to a wide range of organizational uses. This in essence created a series of shadow divisions that were housed under the rubric of the “Internet.” The roles of some staffers make this evident. For example, Zephyr Teachout served as the Director of Online Organizing and Matthew Gross was the Director of Internet Communications, while the Division as a whole was constantly involved in fundraising efforts. Outside of the Internet Division, the campaign’s deployment of networked technologies reconfigured job processes and division boundaries. As Nuxoll, the E-mail Director for the campaign, (2007, p. 197–198) describes:

It was beginning to be unclear that departments were separate entities at all, since field and communications were running together thanks to Meetup; finance was increasingly part of field, courtesy of house parties; the policy people realized they could get their message out with the Web pages, blog, e-mail, and forms; and scheduling knew a few things that impacted the grassroots, reached partly through Meetup and the blog.

This was not, however, a frictionless process, as staffers were at times unclear who they were supposed to be reporting to and, as suggested above, there were at times radically different approaches to using these networked tools. Dean’s National Meetup Coordinator Michael Silberman cites how he straddled both the field operations and Internet Division, so much so that it was not always clear who his supervisor was. At the same time, he describes how he saw his work more in terms of field, given that “the ethos was more in line with what I was doing. While the Internet team was more of the hot ticket, being more reactive, what we were doing was more about building capacity and infrastructure” (Michael Silberman, personal communication, July 28, 2008). Silberman’s comments reveal how different divisions, with divergent goals and with staffers with varying professional backgrounds, had contrasting approaches to similar or the same tools. Nuxoll was hired as a member of the
Internet Division but subsequently moved to Finance. From this vantage point she describes how she navigated divergent genres of e-mail across divisions that were derived from different institutional models, namely organizing for the field staffers, nonprofit direct mail fundraising for the Finance Division, and the MoveOn model for the Internet Division (Kelly Nuxoll, personal communication, November 19, 2008). This spanned the range of the event mobilization pitches of the Field staffers and lengthy, formal direct mail letters of Finance to the short paragraphs and action items that the Internet team used.

These divisional boundary-spanning activities of the Internet staffers, and the lack of clarity about reporting among individuals using the Internet in other divisions, provided Trippi with the opportunity to implement strategy without coordinating with other senior aides or consulting division heads. As Teachout (personal communication, July 10, 2008) recounts, the Internet Division was a “fifth head,” or organizational division, that was “at the bleeding edge of all kinds of things”; for example, Trippi could make “communication decisions through his very willing foot soldiers on the Internet team, as opposed to through a communications person who is expressing any kind of judgment about the nature of messaging.” One oft-remarked upon detail is that the Internet staffers all sat outside of Trippi’s door where he had easy access to them when he wanted something done. This also helped to ensure that while their tactics were flexible at times, goals were not, and routines did develop. For example, fundraising was clearly Trippi’s priority, and the Internet Division was both disciplined about its pursuit and had a reasonable understanding by the late fall of how much it could garner through each clockwork pitch. The success of this online fundraising in turn offered a clear set of metrics, in many respects the most important, through which to ground claims for organizational autonomy and help ensure influence in the strategy and allocative decisions of the campaign. In this sense, the campaign’s use of peer networks for backend operations was also conditioned by organizational dynamics.

**CONCLUSION**

While many scholars see the Dean campaign as the prototypical example of a new, radically participatory democratic politics, other accounts point to the campaign’s complex hybridity (Chadwick, 2007). This article demonstrates that it was a complicated and often contradictory phenomenon. It was clearly not the purely decentralized, emergent, and self-organized effort that some have celebrated. At the same time, Jett and Välikangas’s (2004, p. 6) argument that “the Dean for America campaign is like an island of formal organization in a sea of autonomous volunteers” does not capture the complex interactions between the campaign’s formal structures and peer networks. The campaign’s Internet Division rather successfully deployed a series of innovative organizational practices and networked artifacts that structured the networked sociality of these volunteers. This work in turn was shaped in accordance with the perceived demands of an inter-organizational environment, political institutions, and internal conflicts over resources. These peer networks were not wholly autonomous. While volunteers did take the reins of all sorts of projects, they were in domains far from the substantive policy, strategy, or allocative decisions of the campaign. The formal organization was shaped by efforts to guide the work of these networks, which often required postbureaucratic work processes that in turn were embedded in more stable organizational routines. As noted above, the production of these networks also served as a resource in intra-organizational conflicts.

While the Dean campaign is only one case, this study suggests that a more nuanced discussion of the relationship between peer networks and formal organizations is necessary for our understanding of online forms of democratic practice. Scholarship that celebrates peer-to-peer political collaboration often overlooks the fact that online practices of citizenship are still primarily realized through formal political organizations. Citizenship not only continues to be mediated by formal organizational structures, but also the artifacts they deploy to connect individuals to institutions. As the Dean campaign’s interaction with peer networks makes
clear, even “emergent” forms of collective action can over time become formalized, given the work of stable organizational forms that concentrate resources, make strategic decisions, mobilize activists, and signal to other actors, especially journalists and elected officials, their legitimacy in order to accomplish their goals. As this article has argued, formal organizational resources still matter a great deal and convene and harness peer networks towards ends that are very familiar: fundraising, recruitment, and mobilization. Indeed, new media political consulting companies including Blue State Digital and EchoDitto, both of which were founded by alumni of the Dean campaign, help their organizational clients do precisely this.

Scholarly discussion of these processes is all the more necessary given the implications for democratic theory. To date, the types of networked participation available to citizens through the formal organizations that mobilize them have received too little attention amid the embrace of what appears to be new forms of politics online. It is more complicated, and subsequent campaigns have extended many practices pioneered by Dean staffers. As the preceding demonstrates, the Dean campaign was open to participation in some instrumental realms but had no channels for convening a public debate or incorporating suggestions with regard to the candidate’s policy platform. As such, the campaign was not deliberative nor especially participatory in many contexts; rather it largely reflected an extension of elite-guided, mediated electoral practices that were institutionalized in the field during the 1990s, or by some accounts even much earlier (Howard, 2006). That said, the opportunity to partake in the backend of campaign operations to help Dean get elected in a competitive electoral context still inspired thousands of volunteers and Dean staffers who may not otherwise have participated in the political process.

NOTES

1. For the data presented here that is drawn from publicly available sources, full citations and URLs, where appropriate, are provided for all material quoted and referenced in text. As this article is a piece of a larger research project, materials that bear directly on this study and do not violate the privacy of or disclosure agreements with subjects will be made publicly available for the purposes of replication upon the completion and publication of this work. In the meantime, the author welcomes all inquiries as to the data presented here.

2. Dean’s presidential Web site, Dean for America, went online in September of 2002. It had limited functionality, providing a way to sign-up for e-mails, contact the governor, read about the candidate in the press, and learn about the issues. The contribute link was only added in December. Other primary campaigns, including those of Kerry and Edwards, were at a similar stage in the waning months of 2002.

3. Kerry and Edwards’s Internet staffers had similar professional backgrounds. This suggests that while there were a range of established firms that provided Internet political consulting services during this time period (Howard, 2006), new media campaign staffers were not yet professionalized and were drawn from the commercial, nonprofit, and political sectors. A survey of presidential primary campaigns during the 2007–2008 cycle suggests that this changed somewhat, as a number of campaigns hired prominent figures from the 2004 cycle, especially former Dean staffers, many of whom had launched their own consulting companies.

4. Trippi’s firm Trippi, McMahon & Squier, handled the campaign’s media, including television advertisements. They were roundly criticized for large expenditures in early primary states, which nearly bankrupted the campaign shortly after the New Hampshire primary (Justice, 2004).

REFERENCES


Koenig, J. (2007). Participatory political culture: Everyone’s a kingpin if he or she wants to be. In T. Streeter & Z. Teachout (Eds.), Mousepads, shoe leather, and hope: Lessons from the Howard Dean campaign for
the future of Internet politics (pp. 201–211). Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
APPENDIX

Sample Meetup Agenda (Dean for America, 2003)

HOST GUIDE: JUNE DEAN MEETUP

June Meetup Goals

Excite people to do the following . . .

1. Help Dean reach 100,000 members in the 5 days after the Meetup by taking home sign-up sheets and asking others to join the Dean’s List.
2. Schedule local events for Dean supporters with the new features on DeanForAmerica.com (available Monday, May 26).
3. Schedule fundraising house parties during June to strengthen our numbers before the June 30th FEC filing deadline.

Suggested Agenda

1. Hand a **sign-in sheet** to everyone who walks through the door—and recruit helpers! During your remarks to the group, explain that Dean cannot contact his supporters or interested individuals without these names. Registering for Meetup does not automatically sign you up for Dean emails.

2. Introductions
   a. Introduce Yourself: Why are you working to elect Dean?
   b. Explain how this campaign is different . . . Importance of grassroots activities such as the Meetups. Remind the group that thousands of voters are attending hundreds of Meetups at the same time across the country.
   c. **Briefly** introduce above goals (1 minute or less)
   d. If your Meetup is small enough, ask others why they support Dean (10-15 min.). If your Meetup is large, you’ll probably want to skip this step.

3. Play a Howard Dean **video** if possible, or read the welcome message from Governor Dean, which will be available at www.deanforamerica.com/meetuphosts.

4. Explain the three different **actions** that we’re asking everyone to take:
   a. **Take-home signup sheets:** Distribute the take-home signup sheets (available as a download) to allow people to signup others who want to get involved. Meetup members can help double Dean’s email list by sending the forms back to the campaign as soon as possible. Please be sure to ask people’s permission before you add them to the list.
   b. **Local Dean events:** This week, we’re launching a web page that will allow individuals to schedule local organizing events and sign-up directly on the DFA website. Anyone can plan a Dean event and invite others to join. We can’t miss an opportunity to spread the word and recruit new supporters at parades, fairs and other public events. Please encourage everyone to visit [sic] www.deanforamerica.com and start using these new tools!
   c. **House party fundraisers:** Join or schedule a house party fundraiser before the June 30 FEC filing deadline.

   **www.deanforamerica.com**